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Abstract: Milton Friedman (1962) famously argued there can be no freedom of speech where the 
government owns the printing presses. According to Friedman, political freedom presupposes 
economic freedom (cf. Lawson and Clark 2010). Less well-known are F. A. Hayek's and John 
Jewkes's illustrations of the same principle, both drawing from labor economics. Economic 
planning – the abandonment of a freely operating price-system – cannot function without 
resorting to compulsory assignment of labor. Similarly, no state may simultaneously fix “fair” 
wages and demand a given pattern of productive output and employment. It is impossible to both 
achieve income equality and accomplish an economic plan. Among Hayek's enduring 
contributions, therefore, is a demonstration that liberty hangs on the maintenance of the price-
system.
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The argument that economic freedom presupposes political freedom is most famously 
associated with Milton Friedman who said (1962:7), “the advocacy of 'democratic socialism' 
[rests on the belief that] . . . politics and economics are separate and largely unconnected . . . and 
that any kind of political arrangements can be combined with any kind of economic 
arrangements.” It is possible to protect individual liberties without democratic elections, but 
political freedom is impossible without economic freedom (Lawson and Clark 2010). For 
example, Friedman famously argues (1962:16-18), the freedom of speech cannot be maintained 
when the government owns all the printing presses (cf. Rothbard 1977:26, Mises 1981 
[1922]:538).1 Even were the government to decide to subsidize subversive dissent – as e.g. 
Harrington advocates (1978a:443, 1978b:357; cf. Lavoie 1985a:139) – the government would 
have to decide whose dissent was legitimate and worthy of subsidy. The government could not 
subsidize all dissent lest countless individuals choose to become professional dissenters, and the 
quantity of dissent supplied approach infinity (Friedman 1962:18). But if the government can 
only afford to subsidize some dissent and not others, and if there no private source of credit or 
funding for dissenters, then the democratic socialist government has an absolute power to decide 
whose dissent will be expressed. Even a benevolent and altruistic socialist government cannot 
abdicate this necessarily totalitarian power (cf. Farrant and McPhail 2010b:81). The democratic 
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socialist government must necessarily declare that some dissent is illegitimate, creating the same 
problem of totalitarianism which democratic socialism was meant to avoid in the first place.2
Less well-known, however, is Hayek's use of labor economics to prove the same point. 
This essay explores Hayek's neglected use of labor economics to illustrate how political freedom 
relies on economic freedom – especially on the free operation of the price-system.3 Furthermore, 
we shall see that John Jewkes (1968 [1948]) also used labor economics in the same way as 
Hayek did.4 Even if it were possible to implement an economically rational form of socialism, its 
political institutions could not be democratic; nor could it promise to safeguard individual rights 
and liberties against government abuse, because freedom hangs on the preservation of the price-
system.5
This feature of Hayek's – and Jewkes's – argument has been neglected, especially in 
recent discussions concerning the ultimate validity, soundness, and usefulness of Hayek's 
contributions. Any appreciation or criticism of the value of Hayek's works must take into 
consideration Hayek's arguments about labor economics and the price-system. This essay 
proceeds as follows: section I examines Hayek's earlier statements – especially in The Road to 
Serfdom – about the relationship between freedom of occupation and maintenance of the price-
system, especially in the context of full-blown command planning. This section discusses Jewkes 
as well. Section II shows that the same analytic framework which Hayek used in The Road to 
Serfdom to analyze labor economics under full command socialism, was used by him in later 
works – especially The Constitution of Liberty and Law, Legislation, and Liberty – to analyze 
labor economics in the modern welfare state or mixed economy. Section III uses the findings of 
the previous two sections to reconsider recent debates over the nature and validity of Hayek's 
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claims and contributions. While Jewkes has not been mentioned in the debates over Hayek's 
legacy, in general, whatever is said about Hayek will largely apply to Jewkes as well. We shall 
conclude that Hayek made interesting and important observations concerning labor economics 
which reinforce Friedman's claim that political liberty presupposes economic liberty (cf. Lawson 
and Clark 2010). The nature of Hayek's contribution has been obscured because the debate has 
confusingly focused on a distinction between “socialism” and the “mixed economy,” whereas a 
better distinction is between interventions which do and do not interfere with the price-system. 
Section IV concludes.
I. HAYEK AND JEWKES ON THE ALLOCATION OF LABOR UNDER SOCIALISM
1. Labor Economics according to Hayek and Jewkes
All planning is necessarily coercive; it is impossible to plan the economy without 
planning individual people's lives. Planning means making people's life decisions for them. As 
Hayek notes, many of the planners have failed to realize this fact. “The consolation our planners 
offer us is that this authoritarian direction will apply 'only' to economic matters” (2007 
[1944]:124). But this reply is based on “the erroneous belief that there are purely economic ends 
separate from the other ends of life” (Hayek 2007 [1944]:125; cf. Boettke 1995:11). Economics 
is simply the science of choosing those means which are most satisfactory for accomplishing 
given ends. In this sense, every aspect of life is economic (Mises 1981 [1922]:107). Humans 
cannot accomplish any ends without the use of material means. For example, it is impossible to 
learn and obtain knowledge without access to physical books or classrooms. For government to 
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plan the production of books and classrooms is to plan the terms and conditions on which people 
will be able to obtain knowledge. Therefore, Hayek (2007 [1944]:126) states, economic planning 
raises the question of “whether it shall be we who decide what is more, and what is less, 
important for us, or whether this is to be decided by the planners.” “The authority directing all 
economic activity . . . would control the allocation of the limited means for all our ends” (2007 
[1944]:126). “Economic control is not merely control of a sector of human life which can be 
separated from the rest; it is the control of the means for all our ends” (2007 [1944]:127).6
Marx said that “in place of the government over persons comes the administration of 
things,” to which Mises (1981 [1922]:73) replied, “there can be no administration of goods 
which is not administration of men – i.e. the bending of one human will to another – and no 
direction of productive processes which is not the government over persons – i.e. domination of 
one human will by another.” Furthermore, Mises said (1981 [1922]:493),
Whatever people do in the market economy, is the execution of their own plans. 
In this sense every human action means planning. What those calling themselves 
planners advocate is not the substitution of planned action for letting things go. It 
is the substitution of the planner's own plan for the plans of his fellow men.
Friedman (1962) agreed that political freedom presupposes economic freedom, showing 
that there cannot be freedom of speech where the government owns the printing presses. But 
Hayek and Jewkes instead used labor economics to illustrate the same principle. Planning, they 
said, demands the coercive regimentation of labor, precluding freedom of occupation and even 
the choice where to live. As Hayek (2007 [1944]:129) states, “If they want to plan, they must 
control the entry into the different trades and occupations.” This is due to the problem of 
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economically allocating labor efficiently absent the price-system. In a market economy, labor is 
allocated through differential wages. Every form of labor has some market-clearing wage, and 
wages rise or fall to equilibrate supply and demand for labor. But under socialism, where wages 
are either equal or approximately equal, the only way to allocate labor is by political command, 
dictating by fiat who is to be employed where. But a system of compulsory, involuntary 
employment is hardly compatible with the aspirations of democratic socialism.7 
Therefore, John Jewkes observed in The New Ordeal by Planning (1968 [1948]) that 
“whatever the original intentions of the planners, compulsion of labour soon becomes inevitable. 
For how, otherwise can labour be got into the appropriate jobs?” (1968 [1948]:90). And further 
(1968 [1948]:191),
Labour is one of the resources which must be forced to fit into the [central 
economic planning] scheme as a whole. . . . [D]irection of labour is inevitably 
bound up with a plan courageously followed to its logical conclusion. . . . So long 
as the aim is a planned economy there can be no doubt of the trend of social 
pressures: it will be towards a progressive restriction in the choice of occupation.
Nor was Jewkes engaging in mere idle and unrealistic theorizing. In 1947, the British 
Labour government renewed its wartime requisitioning powers by enacting the Control of 
Engagements Order which empowered the government to conscript labor for essential industries 
(Farrant 2015, Caldwell 2007:47n19). Jewkes (1968 [1948]:191, 193) lamented that
the British planners, against all their best instincts, were driven to the restoration 
of conscription of labour in 1947. . . . By the autumn of that year it was the law of 
land that (with the exception of a small proportion of the working population) no 
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man between the ages of 18 and 50 years and no woman between the ages of 18 
and 40 years could change his or her occupation at will. 
Referring to that same law, Hayek (2007 [1944]:47) noted that merely “six months later [after the 
war] the same government found itself in peacetime forced to put the conscription of labor back 
on the statute book.”8 
Jewkes argued this was not a consequence of any despotic intent or moral depravity or 
abuse of power, but was dictated “by the logic of events” (1968 [1948]:193) and by “the 
inexorable demands of the plan” (ibid.). Likewise, according to Hayek (2007 [1944]:47), “[t]here 
is no better illustration of the manner in which the inherent logic of their policies drove an 
unwilling socialist government into the kind of coercion it disliked.” In contrast to Shleifer and 
Vishny (1994)'s Public Choice criticism of market socialism,9 the problem is not that politicians 
will abuse their power or be insufficiently benevolent or lack proper incentives. There is no 
principle-agent problem here (cf. Caldwell 1997:1875ff.). No matter how benevolent the political 
officials are, any thoroughgoing and successfully-implemented democratic socialism, say Hayek 
and Jewkes, must be totalitarian. If anything, the more sincere and disinterested the politicians 
are, the more thoroughly they will strive to implement the socialist plan by regimenting labor, 
without any regard for their own self-interest (cf. Farrant and McPhail 2010b:81).10
On the other hand, the Control of Engagements Order of 1947 was short-lived and its 
enforcement was weak (Farrant 2015). Quoting Toye, McPhail and Farrant (2012:426) note that 
“the [Labour] government’s determination not to violate its own democratic precepts meant that 
it could not take the measures necessary to guarantee the execution of its own plans.” But pace 
McPhail and Farrant, this does not refute Hayek, but on the contrary, it confirms him. Hayek's 
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claim was that planning and freedom are incompatible (cf. Lawson and Clark 2010). The fact 
that Labour ultimately had to choose between the two proves Hayek right. Hayek had argued 
only that planning and freedom could not be obtained simultaneously, and the fact that Labour 
chose one over the other is consistent with Hayek's (then novel) claim.11
Healthcare provides one interesting example of this labor problem. In another book, A 
Return to Free Market Economics?, Jewkes notes that socialized medicine cannot guarantee true 
equality of access to medical care – including an egalitarian physical distribution of doctors – 
unless the government is “prepared to deprive doctors of freedom to operate in the district of 
their own choice” (1978:84; cf. pp. 67, 70).12 Of course, the government could pay doctors a 
premium to incentivize them to voluntarily relocate to less desirable districts, but this implies 
income inequality. Or the government could distribute health vouchers to its citizens, each worth 
an identical amount of money, so that everyone can afford the same number of dollars of 
healthcare. But then citizens with different medical conditions and living in different districts 
would obtain different levels of healthiness and care for the same number of dollars; once again, 
there would be inequality.13
Astoundingly, none other than the most famous advocate of democratic socialism 
(Makovi 2015a, 2016a) – George Orwell himself – seems to have realized these issues. In 
Orwell's final edition of “London Letters” in the Partisan Review (11:3, summer 1946), Orwell 
argued (to quote Newsinger 1999:139)
that in conditions of full employment if wages are evened out, workers will drift 
away from the more disagreeable jobs . . . Quite incredibly, he [Orwell] argued 
that socialists had to face up to the fact that “you had to make use of forced labour 
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for the dirtier kinds of work.”
Not long before, in July 1945, Orwell had similarly stated in the Partisan Review that Britain 
“will be obliged to both coerce the miners” and that “post-war reconstruction . . . [would require] 
'direction' of labour over a long period” (quoted in Farrant 2015:176n43).14 
Thus, Hayek and Jewkes have shown how abandonment of the price-system and enforced 
income equality tends to necessitate resort to labor-conscription – at least, if economic activity is 
to maintained. Even Orwell agreed with this. But if egalitarianism requires labor-conscription, 
then democratic socialism amounts to letting the slave elect his slave-master without the freedom 
to leave the plantation. If any economic plan is necessarily totalitarian, then democracy will do 
little to alleviate. Democratic socialism must resort to conscription of labor, not because power 
will be maliciously abused but because wages will be forced towards equality. Even the most 
kind-hearted and benevolent planner would have little choice. 
2. Freedom of Occupation under Market Socialism
Strictly speaking, however, government ownership or regulation of the means of 
production does not require equality of wages. Lange could state“[f]reedom of choice of 
occupation [is] assumed” under socialism (1938:83) and that we can “assume that freedom of 
choice in consumption and freedom of choice of occupation are maintained” by socialism 
(1938:72) precisely because Lange accepted income inequality. Discussing the distribution of 
profits and interest to the citizens in the form of a social dividend, Lange (1938:83f.) states,
Freedom of choice of occupation assumed, the distribution of the social dividend 
may affect the amount of services of labor offered to different industries. If certain 
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occupations received a larger social dividend than others, labor would be diverted 
into the occupations receiving a larger dividend. Therefore, the distribution of the 
social dividend must be such as not to interfere with the optimum distribution of 
labor services between the different industries and occupations. . . . Therefore, the 
social dividend must be distributed so as to have no influence whatsoever on the 
choice of occupation. The social dividend paid to an individual must be entirely 
independent of his choice of occupation.
Although Lange is discussing the distribution of firm dividends, not wages, his statement 
implicitly agrees with Hayek and Jewkes that the wage or income in any given industry 
determines how many people will choose to be employed in that industry. Therefore, Lange 
specified that under market socialism, wages will be determined by essentially the same method 
they are in a free-market, with approximately the same kind of inequality (cf. Caldwell 
1997:1862). 
But it is hard to imagine how any socialist would be satisfied with such inequality. As 
Hayek (1978 [1976]:304) responded to Lange, a regime implementing market socialism
could do nothing to secure that the remuneration the the market gave to each 
participant would correspond to what the government regarded as socially just. 
Yet to achieve such a so-called 'just' remuneration was, after all, the whole 
intended purpose of the socialist revolution!15
Let us not forget that the incomes of business executives and managers and the allocation of 
their labor are all regulated by the same economic principles as the incomes and allocation of all 
other kinds of labor. Managerial and executive labor must be allocated efficiently as well, and 
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there is no reason why the market-clearing rate for their labor ought to be significantly different 
under socialism than under capitalism. But this clearly will not satisfy many socialists, who will 
insist on a more thoroughly implemented scheme of (approximate) equality of income. The 
recent reception of Piketty (2014 [2013])'s Capital in the Twenty-First Century should make it 
clear that Lange's endorsement of radical income inequality will not be shared by many 
egalitarians.
It is also important to note that Lange's statement that “The social dividend paid to an 
individual must be entirely independent of his choice of occupation” is not entirely accurate. This 
implies that a per-capita egalitarian distribution of the social dividend – an exactly equal number 
of dollars per person – would be sufficient to avoid affecting labor incentives. But this is not true 
because incentives and values are always marginal. A $100 dividend given to someone who earns 
$100,000 is not the same as the same $100 dividend given to someone who earns only $50,000. 
Tthe value of an objectively constant thing will subjectively vary, depending on what it is being 
compared to. Whether a person chooses to take one job at one wage or another job at another 
wage will depend on the size of the social dividend. Suppose a person is earning $50,000 and 
they know that they can earn twice as much money by working twice as hard. They may find this 
worthwhile. But suppose the social dividend is $20,000 per year, independent of a person's 
occupation. Then the choice is not $50,000 versus $100,000, but instead, it is $70,000 versus 
$120,000. And now the person may not regard it worthwhile to work twice as hard to earn 
$120,000 instead of $70,000. Because value is marginal, an egalitarian distribution of the social 
dividend will affect labor incentives. Lange neglected the income and substitution effects of 
labor versus leisure. The social dividend must be distributed unequally in such a way that 
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incentives will be the same as if it were never distributed at all. Alternatively, Lange could 
specify an egalitarian distribution of the social dividend and then allow wages to vary until the 
combination of unequal wages plus egalitarian social dividend produced an equilibrium pattern 
of employment. The final income package combining unequal wages with equal social dividend 
would still have to be sufficiently non-egalitarian to efficiently allocate labor. 
Assuming that the planned pattern of productive output is sacrosanct – and this implies a 
similarly planned pattern of employment – the social dividend cannot be distributed in such a 
way as to reduce inequality because this would influence the choice of occupation. Freedom of 
choice of occupation thus requires that the government abstain from interfering with inequality 
of income. Wages and incomes must be permitted to be radically unequal. If a specific pattern of 
production is aimed for, then the government must allow wages to freely vary in order to attract 
precisely the right amount and kinds of labor to each industry. Contrariwise, if the government 
settles upon a policy of income equality, then it cannot aim for any particular pattern of 
productive output or distribution of labor across industries.
Since Harrington (1978:443f.) and Schweickart (1992:11) – two advocates of democratic 
socialism – both approvingly cite Lange, it might be assumed that their schemes both presuppose 
freedom of choice of occupation – and therefore, inequality as well. But in fact, neither 
Harrington nor Schweickart understands Lange. Harrington (1978:443f.) approvingly cites 
Lange (1938) and yet he also declares (1978:445) that “The wage structure, then, would be 
infinitely more progressive than it is within capitalism.” Harrington (1978:446) adds that 
“differentials related to skill and output . . . would be tolerated, precisely as an incentive for 
individuals and enterprises to produce more efficiently,” but he is not aware that these 
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differentials may have to be approximately as large as they already are under capitalism. He 
advocates (1978:446) “an egalitarian tax policy [that] would severely limit the differentials and' 
work toward a redistribution of income and wealth,” but he fails to understand that an egalitarian 
tax policy would completely negate the wage differentials he had advocated just a moment 
earlier. It makes no sense to provide wage surpluses as rewards and then to turn right around and 
tax them away again. Then Harrington (1978:446) says “a part of the wage would be received 
collectively, as a social dividend from heightened productivity,” but this would entail precisely 
the same problems as it does for Lange, which we have shown. Like Harrington, Schweickart 
specifies that wage differentials will be restricted in order to limit income inequality (1992:20n7) 
even though this is incompatible with his reliance on Lange (1992:11).16 Harrington and 
Schweickart cannot have their cake and eat it too; they cannot have differential wages and 
egalitarian redistribution and a targeted pattern of consumption, production, and employment. 
One cannot dictate both prices and economic outcomes without resort to direct physical 
coercion. If the government fixes wages and taxes so as to achieve economic equality, then it 
cannot target a specifically patterned economic outcome. If the government seeks to achieve both 
equality and this predetermined productive output, this is possible only through the use of corvée 
and compulsory direction of employment.
In summary: in order to promote income equality while maintaining productive output, a 
socialist regime must forcibly assign everyone to his occupation. Otherwise, the government 
cannot ensure the plan will be implemented. Either a democratic socialist government will insist 
on this coercion, or else it will relent, preserving democratic values at the cost of abandoning 
income equality. Because socialism and individual autonomy are at opposite poles and inversely 
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proportional, the one must be sacrificed to the identical degree to which the other is not. Any 
compromise between socialism and freedom is an inversely proportioned one, with exactly as 
much socialism as there is not freedom, and vice versa. Another solution is, of course, to allow 
income inequality so that labor is allocated by wage differentials, but this would defeat the 
egalitarian aims of socialism. Farrant (2015) is correct to point out that the Control of 
Engagements Order of 1947 was short-lived and barely enforced, and McPhail and Farrant 
(2012:426) rightly call attention to the fact that the Labour government refused to thoroughly 
execute its own plans in order to maintain its adherence to democracy. But this actually confirms 
Hayek and Jewkes, who had simply claimed that planning and freedom are incompatible (cf. 
Lawson and Clark 2010). The fact that Labour could not maintain democratic freedom without 
abandoning planning and egalitarianism is exactly what Hayek and Jewkes had claimed all 
along.
II. THE CONTEMPORARY WELFARE STATE
But is any of this relevant to the modern welfare state or mixed economy? Caldwell 
(2007: 30f., 2011) states that Hayek's Road to Serfdom does not apply to the welfare state. But 
Farrant and McPhail (2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a) and McPhail and Farrant (2012, 2013) note 
that Hayek claimed that the his argument in The Road to Serfdom did apply to the modern 
welfare state (cf. Hayek 1978 [1976]:300).17 Farrant and McPhail argue that because the modern 
welfare state is not totalitarian and because The Road to Serfdom's thesis does apply to the 
welfare state (by Hayek's own admission), therefore, it follows that the thesis of The Road to 
Serfdom must be wrong. But we must examine why Hayek thought The Road to Serfdom applied 
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to the welfare state. Hayek's earlier and later works must not be conflated, and their respective 
historical and institutional contexts must be considered (Caldwell 2011, Boettke and Snow 
2012). While all of Hayek's works share a common analytical framework, this framework is 
applied differently, depending on the institutional context and political environment.
The first thing to recall is the central role which Hayek's conception of the rule-of-law 
plays in The Road to Serfdom (2007 [1944]:112-123). We should therefore expect Hayek's 
criticism of the welfare state to reflect his theory of the rule-of-law. Indeed, in The Constitution 
of Liberty (2011 [1960]:148-165) and again in Law, Legislation, and Liberty (1977:62-106), he 
argued that redistribution of wealth to achieve social justice inherently violates the rule-of-law. 
Treating people equally will result in unequal outcomes and achieving equal outcomes requires 
treating people unequally (2011 [1960]:150; 1966:170; 1977:82). Hayek interpreted the demand 
for “social justice” – i.e. fair incomes – as appropriate only for an “organization” with unitary 
ends, deliberately shaped by a single human will, but inappropriate for a “catallaxy” (market 
economy), a legal order based on formal, purpose-independent rules which enable individuals to 
pursue their own ends (1966:170-172; 1977:69, 75, 85, 96f., 102f.). Hayek's distinction between 
“catallaxy” and “organization” is similar to that which Oakeshott drew between a civic 
association and an enterprise association, and Hayek believed that the rule-of-law could survive 
only in a civic association (cf. Capaldi and Lloyd 2011: xxiii). Only if society per se has some 
teleological end is it meaningful to declare that certain end-state outcomes are fair or unfair. By 
contrast, if society is understood to be a spontaneous order where individuals are free to 
separately pursue their own ends, then it is only the rules which can be fair or unfair, not the 
outcomes. There is no set of general, abstract, procedural rules of justice whose execution will 
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achieve an end-state satisfying social justice (1977:85f.). Replacing commutative with 
distributive justice means displacing private law by public law (1977:87). Achieving a given end-
state requires a discretionary authority to give specific orders to individual people. Transforming 
society from a civic association, a spontaneous order governed by purpose-independent rules, 
into an organization or enterprise association governed by a single comprehensive, overriding 
will, is totalitarian in the literal sense (1977:104; cf. ibid. 83, 99, 180n2). Thus, Hayek 
understood the end-state conception of social justice to be contrary to the rule-of-law. Similarly, 
Hayek (1966:175) rejected the progressive income tax as too discriminatory to satisfy the rule-
of-law. If redistribution of wealth is indeed a violation of the rule-of-law, then the modern 
welfare state must take us along the road to serfdom, almost by definition. Of course, one may 
dispute Hayek's assertion that redistribution is inconsistent with the rule-of-law. But this means 
disputing subjective, normative ethics, and so Farrant and McPhail's argument against Hayek 
becomes less damaging.
Moreover, Hayek (1966) suggests that once one or two measures of “social justice” are 
enacted, violating the rule-of-law, there will be no intellectually consistent way to reject any 
other inroads on the rule-of-law. As Farrant and McPhail (2009:8n11, 2011a:1122, 2011c:8n14) / 
McPhail and Farrant (2013:976) note, sometimes Hayek emphasized the ideas and morals 
endogenously engendered by the welfare state, creating a sort of feedback cycle. Similarly, it 
seems that according to Hayek, is not just that the progressive income tax will by itself alone 
lead us down the road to serfdom. Instead, once one violation of the rule-of-law is granted – no 
matter how innocuous in isolation – there will no reason not to grant countless others. Hayek 
criticized one pinprick because he knew that once the principle was granted that a person may 
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prick another with moral impunity, there was the possibility of death by a million pinpricks. 
After a moral principle is abandoned once or twice, it becomes easier to abandon it forever more. 
As the Talmudic aphorism says, “once a person sins once and repeats it, it [subjectively and 
psychologically] becomes permitted for him.” If this slippery slope has been avoided, it may be 
precisely thanks to Hayek's warning (cf. Witt 1992).
But Hayek went further than calling attention to an ideological slippery slope and the 
neglect of the rule-of-law. In The Constitution of Liberty (2011 [1960]) and in Law, Legislation, 
and Liberty (1977), Hayek added that the redistribution of wealth would create specific 
consequences in labor markets which would necessitate totalitarian inroads, similar to what we 
have seen in The Road to Serfdom. Hayek predicted that people would object to inequalities of 
income that did not correspond to moral desert or merit (Hayek 2011 [1960]:156). Pursuing 
“social justice,” the welfare state must rely on price-controls to fix the remuneration of labor, in 
order to ensure that every form of labor receives its “fair” due (Hayek 1978 [1976]:300f.). But, 
he said, this is inconsistent with freedom of occupation: “distributive justice is irreconcilable 
with freedom in the choice of one's activities” (Hayek 2011 [1960]:156n12). Once incomes are 
fixed, not according to the economic value of the labor but according to merit and desert, labor 
will no longer be efficiently allocated and employees will have no idea where they ought to go. 
“If the remuneration did not correspond to the value that the product of a man's efforts has for his 
fellows, he would have no basis for deciding whether the pursuit of a given object is worth the 
effort and risk. He would necessarily have to be told what to do” (Hayek 2011 [1960]:159f.).18 
And again (1977:82):
a government aiming to secure for its citizens equal material positions  . . . would 
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have to undertake to tell people what to do. Once the rewards the individual can 
expect are no longer an appropriate indication of how to direct their efforts to 
where they are most needed, because these rewards correspond not to the value 
which their services have for their fellows, but to the moral merit or desert the 
persons are deemed to have earned, they lose the guiding function they have in 
the market order and would have to be replaced by the commands of the directing 
authority.
Hayek continued (1977:84), “Nor could anyone who is assured remuneration according to some 
principle which is accepted as constituting 'social justice' be allowed to decide what he is to do” 
because remuneration would be according to moral desert instead of economic value. Therefore, 
Hayek (1977:92) concluded, income inequality 
is a necessary concomitant of any system in which remuneration is based on the 
values the services have to the user and not on an assessment of merit earned. It 
must therefore prevail in any social order in which the individual is free to choose 
whatever occupation he can find and is not assigned to one by authority.
For example, suppose we decide that janitors and electrical engineers are equally 
deserving of the same income. Once this parity is established – as we shall see, it makes little 
difference whether by price-controls or by taxation and subsidy – the law of price-controls will 
operate. The market-clearing wages of electrical engineers are greater than the market-clearing 
wages of janitors, and once their wages are compulsorily equated, there will be a relative surplus 
of janitors and a relative shortage of electrical engineers. Whether this implies manifest shortages 
and surpluses, or whether the suboptimal misallocation is concealed, depends on the specific 
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interventions. A minimum wage will create an unemployable surplus. But while a subsidy will 
create an over-supply, the over-supply will not be an unemployable surplus. Furthermore, 
unemployment created by a price-floor can be concealed by a government price-support, i.e. a 
promise to provide government jobs to all those who cannot find private employment at the 
stipulated wages. But whether the over- and under-supplies are concealed or manifest, the 
inefficient misallocation is real. Unless chaos and inefficiency are tolerated, the labor of janitors 
and electrical engineers must be compulsorily allocated to ensure that precisely the right number 
are employed. Thus, “every such attempt at deliberate control of some remunerations is bound to 
create further demand for new controls” (Hayek 2011 [1960]:164). One intervention begets 
another, just as Mises (1996 [1929], 1998) predicted.
In a 1976 lecture, Hayek (1978 [1976]) repeated several of these points. Speaking about 
the welfare state, Hayek (1978 [1976]:300) “greatly doubt[ed] their capacity to combine their 
aim of a through government redistribution of wealth with the preservation, in the long run, of a 
modicum of personal freedom.” Hayek claimed that to achieve its goals, the welfare state must 
“preserve functioning markets [in the] . . . factors of production . . . and also somehow . . . to 
influence at least the prices of labour . . . To satisfy both of these requirements in full is 
impossible.” (1978 [1976]:300). Echoing Mises's theory of intervention (Mises 1996 [1929], 
1998), Hayek (1978 [1976]:300) continued, “Though the process may be gradual, a government 
which begins to control prices to secure popular conceptions of justice is bound to be driven step 
by step towards the control of all prices; and, since this must destroy the functioning of the 
market, to a central direction of the economy.” In this lecture, Hayek also repeated the argument 
that with the abolition of differential wages must come the compulsory direction of labor (Hayek 
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1978 [1976]:307):
the individual can be left free to choose the directions of his efforts only if 
rewards fluctuate with the value of the services he can contribute to the society's 
common pool of resources. If his income is politically determined, he loses not 
merely the incentive but also the possibility of deciding what he ought to do in the 
general interest. And if he cannot know himself what he must do to make his 
services valuable to his fellows, he must be commanded to do what is required.
If the salaries of janitors and of electrical engineers are made equal, then no individual has any 
way of knowing whether he will serve the public better by being one or the other. He loses 
access to the data which would inform him of society's needs as well as the incentive to act on 
any such information. Therefore, the government must compel him to choose that occupation 
where labor is more relatively scarce.
It is important to notice that taxation of incomes is a form of price-control on labor as 
well. If the natural market rate for a given type of labor is $100,000, then there is not much 
difference between taxing that labor to the amount of $30,000 versus fixing that labor at $70,000 
and leaving it un-taxed. The over- and under-supply may be concealed or manifest, but they exist 
either way. The reason why progressive income taxes have not produced obviously totalitarian 
outcomes, however, is because contemporary welfare states have not attempted to ensure that 
any particular kind of labor is done with any particular frequency or with any particular 
productive output. In other words, contemporary governments are content to manipulate the 
returns to different kinds of labor and then allow the market to decide how many people will 
occupy themselves in those various occupations and how much output they will produce. They 
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have manipulated prices but tolerated the market consequences of those manipulations. As 
Hayek's mentor and colleague, Mises said (1981 [1922]:446), in a free-market, “taxation . . . 
imposes certain obstacles in individual businesses, but leaves the market to deal with its effect 
upon the prices of commodities and wages, on profits, interest, and rents.”
Hayek's emphasis on the role of prices recalls Röpke's distinction between “compatible” 
and “incompatible” interventions (Röpke 1992 [1942]:260; cf. 1987 [1951]:7f.):
we find that a differentiation between two groups of state intervention is of 
foremost importance, for which we have suggested the terms “compatible” and 
“incompatible” interventions: i.e. those that are in harmony with an economic 
structure based on the market, and those which are not. Interventions which do 
not interfere with the price mechanism and with the automatism of the market 
derived from it are compatible, they let themselves be absorbed as new “data”; 
interventions which paralyse the price mechanism and therefore force us to 
replace it by a planned (collectivist) order, we call incompatible. 
Similarly, referring to J. S. Mill, Hayek spoke of “Mill's Muddle,” the belief that production and 
distribution could be disconnected from one another (Ebeling 1977:11). In fact, production is 
distribution; the same prices simultaneously incentivize and remunerate production, and to alter 
distribution is therefore to alter production. But contemporary welfare states have not attempted 
to direct distribution in one direction and production in the other. Instead, they have intervened in 
one and let the other adjust itself accordingly. If taxing one form of labor and subsidizing another 
has resulted in a shift in production and employment from one industry to another, welfare states 
have not generally attempted to counteract this tendency by compulsory redirection of labor. 
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But suppose the governments were to take Mill seriously and disconnect production from 
distribution to achieve distributive or social justice. Suppose governments were to tax a given 
kind of labor and simultaneously insist that the employment and output in the taxed industry be 
precisely the same as it was before the tax. Or suppose these governments were to tax a given 
kind of labor and also demand that employment and output in the corresponding industry satisfy 
some arbitrary figure regardless of prices – say, that there must be such-and-such a number of 
coal miners and such-and-such an output of coal. This could not be accomplished without forced 
labor. No government may arbitrarily determine incomes according to egalitarian standards of 
“fairness” – whether by setting a tax or by fixing a wage-rate – and simultaneously fix a level of 
employment and output in the corresponding industry, without resort to corvée. 
Modern welfare states have instead chosen to relatively equalize wages but permit 
production and employment to vary themselves, not according to any plan. No welfare state 
today fixes the prices of labor in the way which Hayek feared they would. But this does not 
refute Hayek's argument that if welfare states were to fix wages – whether by redistribution or by 
price-control – and to insist on a specific pattern of output and employment regardless of prices – 
then we would wind up traveling along the road to serfdom. The fact that welfare states today 
have wisely eschewed price-controls does not refute Hayek's prediction that the implementation 
of such controls would carry totalitarian consequences. Therefore, Farrant and McPhail are 
incorrect to assert that the thesis of The Road to Serfdom has been falsified by the non-
totalitarian nature of contemporary welfare states. Welfare states simply have not adopted the 
policies which Hayek feared they would, but we have no reason to doubt Hayek's claim that if 
welfare states had attempted to implement price-controls on labor without affecting productive 
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output, this would have required compulsory regimentation of labor. Moreover, if Hayek's 
prediction was wrong, it is may be because his warning was heeded (cf. Caldwell 1997:1868f., 
Witt 1992, Boettke and Snow 2012).19
III. THE ROAD TO SERFDOM RECONSIDERED
Our foregoing discussion has implications for recent debates over Hayek's legacy. In a 
series of articles, Farrant and McPhail (2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2012) / McPhail and Farrant 
(2012, 2013) (hereafter: F&M, M&F) have questioned the validity and soundness of Hayek's 
arguments. First, F&M contend that contrary to Caldwell (2007: 30f), Hayek's arguments were 
not directed solely against full-blown command planning and socialism, but that Hayek also 
believed his arguments applied to the contemporary welfare state or mixed economy as well. 
Because the welfare state has not resulted in Soviet- or Nazi-style totalitarianism, F&M say, 
Hayek's arguments must be mistaken. F&M also reject Caldwell's (2011) claim that The Road to 
Serfdom's criticism of central planning must be distinguished from Hayek's milder criticism of 
the welfare state in The Constitution of Liberty (2011 [1960]) and in Law, Legislation, and 
Liberty (1977). Caldwell (2011, 1997:1866-1871) argues that The Road to Serfdom must be 
understood in its specific historical and institutional context (cf. Boettke and Snow 2012) and 
that it must not be confused with Hayek's later works, which are more relevant to the political 
situation today. F&M claim that Hayek himself considered all his works to relate to a single, 
ongoing theme. In reply, Caldwell (2011) and Boettke and Snow (2012) have argued that F&M 
misunderstand and under-appreciate Hayek's arguments.
None of the participants in this debate, however, have mentioned how central the price-
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system is to Hayek's argument that political liberty presupposes economic liberty. We have seen 
that among Hayek's claims was that freedom of occupation cannot be maintained without the free 
operation of the price-system. Without prices, labor can be allocated only compulsorily. This 
forces us to reevaluate F&M's claims in two ways: first, F&M must reconsider the significance 
of Hayek's claim that political freedom requires economic freedom (cf. Boettke 1995, Lawson 
and Clark 2010). If F&M wish to question the merit of Hayek's contributions, they will have to 
contend with Hayek's argument that freedom of occupation cannot be maintained without prices. 
Second, in demonstrating how crucial prices are to Hayek's claims, this essay suggests that it 
may be a red-herring to ask – as the previous participants to this debate have – whether Hayek 
criticized socialism or the welfare-state. Instead, we should say that Hayek criticized any 
suspension or interference with prices, regardless of whether this was in the context of socialism 
or the mixed economy.
F&M are completely right to criticize simple-minded commentators who use The Road to  
Serfdom to conflate Obamacare with Stalin's Five Year Plans and to condemn the Obama 
administration as equivalent to Hitler (F&M 2010a, 2010b, 2012:95; M&F 2012:423f., 
2013:967). At the same time, Boettke (1995), Caldwell (1997, 2011), and Boettke and Snow 
(2012) are correct that Hayek's works have contributed a number of useful and valuable 
analytical insights which are applicable to a variety of economic systems and policies.
Authors on both sides of the debate are all correct and yet wrong because they have been 
asking the wrong question: they have assumed that either Hayek criticized only socialism, or else 
he criticized both socialism and the mixed economy in exactly the same way. Instead, we argue 
that Hayek's arguments were institutionally contingent: Hayek criticized a given system or policy 
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insofar as it interfered with the price-system. Socialism and the mixed-economy interfere with 
prices in different ways and so they produce different effects, but they fall under the same 
analytical umbrella of interference with prices.20 Therefore, against F&M's (2010b) claim that 
Hayek himself would have agreed with those who ignorantly compare Obama to Hitler, we 
emphasize the contingent nature of Hayek's arguments. Whereas F&M (2011a:108) call Hayek's 
logic “threadbare and unpersuasive,”21 we insist with Boettke (1995) that Hayek's works express 
a variety of important theoretical insights.22
If the welfare state has not take us down the same road to serfdom as command-and-
control socialism, as F&M say Hayek predicted it would, it may be because because taxation and 
redistribution of income do not interfere with the operation of the price-system the way 
command-and-control does (Ikeda 2015:409, 414). F&M (2009:10n17, 2010a:118n13) briefly 
remark that Hayek approvingly cites Ludwig von Mises’s Kritik des Interventionismus (Mises 
1996 [1929]; cf. Mises 1998).23 But they do not explore the deeper significance of Hayek's 
citation of Mises. That work by Mises was written specifically regarding price-controls, arguing 
that interventions which controlled prices – setting floors and ceilings – would lead to shortages 
and surpluses which would tend to motivate additional interventions to fix the problems caused 
by price-controls. Mises argued that one price-control led to another until every price in the 
entire economy was controlled or supplanted by command-and-control, resulting in de facto 
socialism (cf. Mises 1974 [1950]). But Mises's argument does not apply to taxes and subsidies 
which preserve the operation of the price-system. Significantly, in an essay predominately 
discussing how price-controls lead to socialism, Mises briefly criticizes progressive taxation, and 
his argument is not – as one might expect – that progressive taxation leads to socialism or 
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totalitarianism, but only that progressive taxation reduces savings and investment and leads to 
capital decumulation (Mises 1974 [1950]:32; cf. Mises 1981 [1922]:237). Obviously, Mises 
considered price-controls and progressive taxation to lead to quite different outcomes, and it is 
fair to hypothesize that Hayek likely thought similarly. Hayek's arguments are more easily 
understood if we interpret him to be distinguishing – like  Röpke (1992 [1942]:260, 1987 
[1951]:7f.) – between interventions which are compatible with the price-system and those which 
are not. This interpretation of Hayek is more fruitful than debating whether Hayek meant to 
criticize only command planning (Caldwell) or the mixed economy as well (F&M). For example, 
a debate whether Hayek would have supported public education or school vouchers will be 
fruitless if we insist on categorizing public education as “socialism” and vouchers as “mixed 
economy.” Instead, we should recognize that vouchers are more compatible with the price-
system. Put this way, it is immediately obvious why Hayek probably would have preferred 
vouchers.24
F&M cite Samuelson (F&M 2009:5,9,11,12; 2010a:107; 2010b:84; 2012:101) and Sachs 
(F&M 2010a:98) who argue that if Hayek were correct, we may have expected Scandinavian 
socialism to have turned totalitarian by now. But if we understand Hayek to be criticizing 
interference with the price-system, we see that this criticism misses the point entirely.25 The 
Scandinavian system has historically relied more on redistribution of income than regulation or 
nationalization. In fact, Sweden offers a high degree of protection of private property and 
freedom to internationally trade (Stein 1991, Sanandaji 2011, Tupy 2016, Mitchell 2016). To a 
large degree, Scandinavian “socialism” (sic) has entailed giving some individuals a cash subsidy 
and then allowing them free rein to spend this cash however they desire in a free market. In 
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many ways, Sweden is more pro-market than the United States. This is not the socialism which 
Hayek criticized. Hayek called attention to this fact, noting in this 1976 preface to The Road to 
Serfdom (2007 [1944]:54) that, 
At the time I wrote, socialism meant unambiguously the nationalization of the 
means of production and the central economic planning which this made possible 
and necessary. In this sense Sweden, for instance, is today very much less 
socialistically organized than Great Britain or Austria, though Sweden is 
commonly regarded as much more socialistic.26
If anything, Scandinavian “socialism” has vindicated Hayek precisely because its relative 
success is built upon a maintenance of the price-system. Scandinavia has generally eschewed 
command-and-control regulation of the sort which would have interfered with the price-system. 
This suggests that it is not safety nets which make robust markets viable – by protecting the 
least-well-off from the vagaries of markets -- but the opposite: it is robust markets which produce 
the wealth which makes safety nets affordable.27 This explains why Sweden can afford its 
welfare system while Greece and Venezuela cannot. Highly-regulated economies cannot absorb 
the costs of extensive welfare states. Sweden has vindicated Hayek by combining a high level of 
income taxation and redistribution with a low level of regulation and command, thereby 
maintaining the price-system and private property.28 The success of the Swedish system is quite 
consistent with Hayek's theoretical reasons for approving the institution of a minimum social 
safety net (Hayek 1977:87), and his endorsement of Friedman's negative income tax (Ebeling 
1977:12).
Furthermore, there is the crucial question whether actors are permitted to freely adjust 
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their behavior to the tax regime, or whether the state demands behaviors which run counter to the 
incentives created by the taxes – in other words, whether the state requires its subjects to behave 
as if taxed products and activities are not taxed at all (cf. Mises 1981 [1922]:446). Suppose the 
state were to tax the incomes of those employed in a given industry and yet insist that the level of 
employment in that industry remain the same as it was prior to the imposition of the tax. A 
command to behave as if taxation does not exist interferes with the price-system more than the 
taxation itself.
Fittingly, Lawson and Clark (2010:235) note that
the Hayek–Friedman hypothesis is confirmed most strongly when looking at the 
legal structure and property rights and the regulation areas of the EFW [Economic 
Freedom of the World] index. These two areas are more closely identified with 
political and civil liberties than the other areas of the EFW index (fiscal size of 
government, monetary policy, and trade policy).
The multidimensional nature of the EFW allows us to avoid sterile debates between socialism 
and the mixed economy.29 Rather than trying to pigeonhole actually existent economies into one 
category or the other, we may recognize that different interventions have different effects, 
affecting prices and property in different ways. This multidimensional understanding of 
economic freedom also allows us to better understand Hayek. Furthermore, if we understand 
Hayek to be concerned with the operation of the price-system, then his political and his 
economic works turn out to share a common theme; “The Use of Knowledge in Society” (Hayek 
1945) turns out to be arguing much the same point as The Road to Serfdom. Ceteris paribus, any 
reading of Hayek which unifies his works ought to be preferred.
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IV. CONCLUSION
It is well-known that Friedman (1962:16-18) illustrated the principle of the inseparability 
of political and economic freedom using the freedom of speech. He famously argued that there 
can be no freedom of the press where the government owns the printing presses (cf. Rothbard 
1977:26, Mises 1981 [1922]:538). But Hayek (2007 [1944], 2011 [1960]) and Jewkes (1968 
[1948]) chose instead to illustrate the inseparability principle using labor economics, 
demonstrating the necessity of compulsorily labor whenever the price-system is abandoned. 
According to Hayek and Jewkes, egalitarian socialism necessitates the abolition or severe 
restriction of differential wages, making it impossible to allocate labor according to any 
economic plan without resorting to compulsion and regimentation. Moreover, as we saw, Hayek 
predicted that the welfare state would adopt labor regulations which would interfere with the 
operation of the price-system and deny the rule-of-law, necessitating resort to compulsory labor. 
Perhaps Hayek and Jewkes chose this example because the problem is so much more 
stark and forbidding. Most citizens do not publish newspaper editorials very often, so the denial 
of the freedom of speech may not mean much for them. But there is no citizen who would not be 
terrified by the prospect of slavery, the paradigmatic denial of individual freedom. And yet 
socialism cannot operate without literal slavery – compulsory labor. Fittingly, Hayek's work was 
titled, The Road to Serfdom. If socialism requires regimenting labor, what hope for any other 
kind of freedom can there be? 
Previous debates over Hayek's legacy have been confused because they insisted on a 
dichotomy between socialism and the mixed economy. This distinction is too simplistic and uni-
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dimensional and it does not do justice to the richness of Hayek's thought. Hayek criticized any 
system which interfered with prices and property, regardless of what we would call it. While 
Hayek may not have predicted the future accurately, this does not negate the validity of his 
analytical framework, nor does this refute his criticism of particular interventions which the 
government happily turned out to eschew. His argument that political liberty is impossible 
without economic liberty has not been refuted (Lawson and Clark 2010). Hayek's argument is an 
institutionally contingent one, and whether a given intervention will lead us down the road to 
serfdom depends how compatible a given intervention is with the functioning of the price-
system. A tax which allows production, employment, and consumption to adjust themselves to 
the new pattern of prices will not interfere with freedom to the same extent as a regulation which 
simultaneously fixes a tax upon a resource or type of labor and nevertheless insists on given 
level of productive output. Nor is his analysis of given policies is wrong simply because the 
government adopted different policies in the end. The analytical framework is not less valid 
simply because history took one turn rather than another – especially if we consider the 
possibility that Hayek's predictions might have been falsified precisely because others heeded his 
warning (cf. Caldwell 1997:1868f, Witt 1992, Boettke and Snow 2012).
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